Else's 1986 (p. 159) claims that most interpretations of Aristotle assert he requires some form of pity, fear, and catharsis to be produced in audiences. Because most of these interpretations do not explicitly address the question we aim to answer in this paper, there is some risk of misinterpreting most Aristotle commentators as supporting the position we oppose. However, the overall impression is so strong that we confidently refer to this view as the "common" interpretation.
As an analysis of tragedy, the common interpretation is unsatisfactory. It is well-known that people's emotional reactions to the events they witness or hear about depend on their emotional states at the time. If Aristotle truly believed certain emotional responses in audiences were necessary for tragedy, or good tragedy, he would have dedicated at least some pages to preparing people so that exposure to dramatic tragedy would effectively arouse the correct emotions. This Aristotle does not do. Instead, his primary concern appears to be describing what is and is not, and what should and should not be, included within works of dramatic tragedy. This alone should raise suspicions that the common interpretation is flawed.
A second difficulty is epistemological: We can often identify certain features by merely inspecting an object. For example, we can tell that a man is doubled over merely by looking at him. However, for other kinds of features, we must go beyond mere inspection to ascertain that the object possesses them. No mere inspection of a man will reveal whether or not he is an uncle.
On the common interpretation of Aristotle, we cannot determine whether a text or performance is a tragedy, or a good tragedy, just by inspecting it. If we take Aristotle seriously and wish to be scrupulous in our judgments concerning dramatic works, in addition to inspecting the work's text, story, or performance, we must also conduct a psychological study of the members of its audience to ensure that pity, fear, and catharsis have indeed been produced before we can confidently judge it to be a tragedy, or a good one. This is counterintuitive.
It may be argued that the effects on audiences, or lack thereof, are taken as signs of their success or failure. This is true, of course. But the issue here is whether a production must produce psychological effects on audiences to be good. I may judge a man to be an uncle by listening to what he says about his family. But nothing he says makes him an uncle. Audiences who pay and voluntarily attend performances may well be in the right frames of mind to recognize the quality of a work of theater and be moved by it. They may engage with the work and have feelings appropriate to what is happening on stage. But the fact that what is being performed on stage is a good tragedy being performed well is certainly no guarantee that effects like these will follow.
Finally, Aristotle mentions the pleasure men take in such "imitations," i.e., in make-believe. Yet if these works were known to produce real pity and fear, it would seem that only masochists would voluntarily view them.
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