In defining dramatic tragedy, Aristotle appeals in part to the psychological notions of pity, fear, and catharsis. The question to be addressed in this paper is whether, in Aristotle's analysis, the production of pity, fear, and a catharsis of these emotions in audiences—readers, auditors, or viewers—is essential to works of dramatic tragedy, or at least good works of dramatic tragedy. We follow Else (1956, 1986) in holding that it is not.
Topics concerning pity, fear, and especially catharsis are some of the most frequently discussed in the literature on Aristotle's analysis of tragedy. However, very rarely in this literature is it explicitly stated that the above question is the one under discussion. Fortenbaugh (1975) and Randall (1960) definitely come down on the opposite side, interpreting Aristotle as holding that the production of these psychological effects by a dramatic work is essential to its being at least a good tragedy. Many commentators, among them Brunius (1966), Butcher (1895, Ch. VI, especially p. 244), Fergusson (1961, pp. 34-36), Halliwell (1986, 1987, especially p. 91), and Ross (1953, pp. 287-289), while not explicitly saying so, give a strong impression that they too subscribe to this view.
After all, for Aristotle, the aim of dramatic tragedy is to effect a catharsis of the emotions of pity and fear; hence, it seems natural to conclude that the degree to which this is accomplished is the measure of the quality of a work. Unfortunately, it is almost never crystal clear that this is indeed the topic under discussion, rather than some other involving pity, fear, and catharsis—for example, what feelings of pity, fear, and catharsis are, or what elements in tragedies produce them. Of course, tragedies do attract and move audiences. They do have psychological effects. Audience reactions to plays are taken as evidence of their quality. But whether theater works have to have such effects to be tragedies, or good ones, is a different issue.
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